2021 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

12-20-2021

USA v. Remy Augustin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Remy Augustin" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 1026.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/1026

This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

CLD-046

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-3609
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
REMY AUGUSTIN,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(D.V.I. Criminal No. 1:00-cr-00004-002)
District Judge: Honorable Wilma A. Lewis
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to Lack of Timely Filing or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 16, 2021
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2021)
_________
OPINION*
_________

PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Remy Augustin appeals pro se from the District Court’s denial of his motion for
compassionate release. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District
Court’s judgment.
In 2001, Augustin was sentenced to a term of 421 months’ imprisonment after he
was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and related offenses, including a conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), in the District Court of the Virgin Islands. In 2020, Augustin filed a
pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The District
Court denied Augustin’s motion, concluding that he had not established any
extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Augustin has appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We review the District Court’s
order for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir.
2020). “Courts wield considerable discretion in compassionate-release cases, and we will
not disturb a court’s determination unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction
that [it] committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing
of the relevant factors.” United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2021)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
We will affirm the District Court’s decision. The compassionate-release provision
states that a district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of

We note that Augustin’s initial notice of appeal appeared to be untimely filed, but the
District Court granted him an extension of time to file his notice of appeal. The
Government does not assert that Augustin’s notice of appeal was untimely filed. See
United States v. Muhammud, 701 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2012).
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probation or supervised release” if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Augustin first argued that compassionate release was warranted because the
enhanced penalty for his § 924(c) conviction would not have been triggered if the First
Step Act had been in effect when he was sentenced. However, as Augustin
acknowledges, the changes to § 924(c) under the First Step Act are inapplicable to his
sentence under the Act’s explicit retroactivity limitations. We have concluded that “[t]he
nonretroactive changes to the § 924(c) mandatory minimums . . . cannot be a basis for
compassionate release” because “Congress specifically decided that the changes to the
§ 924(c) mandatory minimums would not apply to people who had already been
sentenced.” See Andrews, 12 F.4th at 261.
Augustin also argued that his youth and age, as well as his efforts to rehabilitate
himself in prison, constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.
However, the District Court appropriately noted that Augustin’s youth and age were
already considered at sentencing, in the context of his commission of a series of violent
offenses over the course of 10 days, and that Augustin’s criminal record did not suggest
an isolated incident of poor judgment by a young person. We see no abuse of discretion
in the District Court’s conclusion that Augustin’s efforts at rehabilitation alone were not
an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. See id. at 262. Accordingly, we will
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summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.2
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Appellee’s motion to stay the appeal is denied as moot.
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